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Chapter	1
Edmund	Husserl:	Transcending	Ideology
Molly	Brigid	Flynn,	Assumption	College
Husserl	was	a	German	mathematician-turned-philosopher,	born	 in	Moravia—now	part	of	 the
Czech	 Republic,	 then	 part	 of	 the	 Austro-Hungarian	 Empire—into	 a	 Jewish	 household.	 His
breakthrough	work,	The	Logical	 Investigations	of	1900–1901,	 started	 the	phenomenological
movement,	which	tremendously	influenced	European	thought	in	the	twentieth	century	and	which
continues	today	in	Europe,	America,	and	beyond.
After	 reading	 the	 New	 Testament,	 Husserl	 converted	 as	 a	 young	man	 to	 a	 rather	 non-
doctrinal	 Christianity.	 He	 was	 a	 patriotic	 German	 and	 lost	 a	 son	 in	World	War	 I.	 He	 was
known	for	 living	a	stoical,	 respectable,	and	even	bourgeois	 life	at	home	and	 in	universities:
writing,	lecturing,	and	talking.	In	1933,	his	son	Gerhard,	a	philosopher	of	law,	lost	his	job	at
the	same	time	that	the	emeritus	Husserl	was	denied	privileges	at	his	university,	because	of	their
Jewish	ethnicity.	His	most	 famous	student	and	his	 successor	 in	 the	chair	at	 the	University	of
Freiburg	 became	Rector	 there	 and	was	 just	 one	 of	many	National	 Socialists	 called	 upon	 to
enforce	such	ordinances.	In	1938	Husserl	died	naturally	before	he	might	have	died	violently—
as	Edith	Stein,	 another	 of	 his	 students,	 did	 at	Auschwitz	 in	 1942.	 In	 1939,	 his	wife	 and	his
incredible	mass	of	papers	were	smuggled	safely	to	Belgium.
After	 the	 Logical	 Investigations,	 Husserl	 published	 several	 more,	 and	 indeed	 better,
books	and	essays	and	lectures,	treating	philosophically,	e.g.,	logic,	perception,	our	experience
of	 other	 people,	 knowledge,	 time,	 human	 rational	 and	 spiritual	 life,	 and	 the	 “lifeworld”	 of
straightforward	human	experience.	He	was	a	committed	critic	of	 the	 irrationalism	of	 radical
subjectivistic	skepticisms,	historicism,	psychologism,	and	any	theory	that	attempts	to	convince
human	persons	that	they	are	incapable	of	reason	and	knowledge.	For	Husserl,	the	human	mind
finds	 its	 fulfillment	 in	 truth,	 insight,	 evidence;	 that	 is,	 authentic	 thought	 is	knowledge	of	 true
being.	Still,	Husserl	avoids	a	naïve	rationalism,	identifying	this	fulfillment	as	an	infinite	task,
with	relative	and	temporary	victories.	While	a	defender	of	 the	human	ability	 to	know	and	of
philosophy	as	a	science,	he	also	saw	clearly	 that	absolute	knowledge	is	only	approached	by
humans	and	that	philosophy	is	always	re-beginning.
He	 wrote	 much	 more	 than	 he	 published.	 His	 posthumously	 published	 works,	 lectures,
letters,	 and	 personal	 research	 manuscripts	 show	 that	 he	 had	 a	 philosophical	 breadth	 and	 a
keenness	for	detail	and	deep	problems	that	belong	to	but	a	handful	of	philosophers	in	history.
There	 is	 practically	no	philosophical	 theme—from	essences	 to	 cultural	 ontology	 to	 ethics—
that	he	did	not	write	about	rather	intensely.	Except,	perhaps,	for	political	life.
He	 was	 not	 a	 political	 philosopher.	 He	 was	 an	 apolitical	 philosopher.	 Still,	 I	 think,
Husserl’s	apolitical	philosophy	has	some	deep,	if	indirect,	political	implications.
The	 marching	 banner	 for	 phenomenologists	 has	 been	 “To	 the	 things	 themselves!”	 and
phenomenologists	 feel	 most	 at	 home	 describing	 objects	 as	 they	 show	 up	 to	 us.	 Husserl’s
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philosophy	 attempts	 to	 recover	 the	 objectivity	 of	 reality	 without	 succumbing	 to	 a	 crude
objectivism.	It	recognizes	that	the	objects	we	experience	have	essences	that	structure	how	we
can	experience	them,	and	it	is	as	interested	in	the	subjective	life	in	which	we	experience	things
as	it	is	in	the	things	experienced.	Phenomenology	resists	the	objectification	of	persons,	rational
subjects	who	experience	and	know	the	world,	into	mere	things;	at	the	same	time,	it	resists	the
anti-realism	that	would	deny	either	the	objectivity	of	worldly	things	or	the	special	and	distinct
type	of	“transcendental”	being	that	each	human	person	has.
This	 unjustly	 cursory	 summary	 of	 the	 man’s	 life	 and	 conclusions	 must	 suffice	 as	 an
introduction	to	this	chapter	and	an	invitation	to	the	reader	for	a	closer	look.	This	essay	offers
an	Husserlian	account	of	ideology	and	suggests,	with	some	appeal	to	“the	things	themselves”
(the	 facts	 of	 his	 life),	 how	Husserl	 the	 teacher	 succeeded	 and	 perhaps	 failed	 in	 an	 time	 of
ideological	illusions	and	tragedies.
Husserl’s	Apolitical	Philosophy
Transcendental	philosophy,	a	very	useless	art,	does	not	aid	 the	 lords	and	masters	of	 this	world,	 the	politicians,
engineers,	industrialists.1
Husserl	wrote	to	his	son	Gerhard	(July	5,	1935)	that	his	philosophy	is	“wholly	unpolitical.”2
Except	 for	 a	 few	 scattered	 remarks,	 he	 is	 at	 his	most	 political	when	he	 speaks	between	 the
World	Wars	about	the	cultural	“crisis”	and	growing	irrationalism	of	European	life.	The	crisis,
that	 is,	was	 in	his	 lights	not	 primarily	political.	The	obvious,	 terrifying,	 and	 tragic	political
events	 of	 this	 period	 of	 European	 history	 seem	 to	 have	 appeared	 to	 him	 as	 symptoms	 of	 a
deeper	disease	of	spirit	and	values:	a	disorder	 in	our	beliefs	about	 reason,	personhood,	and
truth.	Namely,	he	believed	that	human	beings	as	rational	animals	live	under	absolute	norms	of
truth.	To	be	genuinely	human	persons,	to	live	up	to	our	personhood,	we	must	seek	to	live	up	to
truth,	where	truth	is	not	just	theoretical	but	also	evaluative	and	practical—it	is	a	matter	of	how
and	what	we	think,	but	also	of	how	and	what	we	feel,	value,	and	do.	The	crisis	of	values	he
identified	and	 fought	against	 in	his	 later	years	arose,	he	 thought,	 from	a	 terrible	 rejection	of
reason.	A	 narrow	 rationalism,	 identified	 usually	with	 Enlightenment	 thought,	 is	 one	 form	 of
this:	 “The	 European	 crisis	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 a	misguided	 rationalism.”3	 This	 rationalism	 had
symptoms	 (e.g.,	naturalism,	consumerism,	a	 rebirth	of	 egoistic	nationalism,	Nazism)	 in	other
cultural	and	political	phenomena,	which	should	be	seen,	at	least	partly,	as	misguided	responses
to	or	fallouts	of	this	rejection	of	reason’s	central	role	in	human	life.
He	 thought	 that,	 to	 address	 this	 deeper	 crisis,	 what	 European	 life	 needed	most	 was	 a
rediscovery	of	reason	in	its	properly	broad	and	rich	sense.	And	this	was	the	task	especially	of
philosophy	and	the	philosophy	of	the	other	sciences.	Husserl	therefore	emphasized	(in	a	way
many	 of	 his	 readers	 find	 embarrassing)	 the	 beginnings	 of	 philosophy	 in	 ancient	Greece;	 the
telos	 of	European	 culture	 as	 the	development	 of	 this	 love	of	 truth	with	 its	 concern	 for	 self-
critique	and	evidence;	the	need	for	Europe	to	rededicate	itself	to	this	idea;	and	our	vocation	to
share	 it	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 humanity.	 He	 feared	 that	 our	 response	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 modern
rationalism	would	be	a	“fall	into	hostility	toward	spirit	and	into	barbarity,”	but	he	hoped	that
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we	might	 instead	overcome	what	 a	 narrow	 rationalism	has	 led	us	 into,	 namely,	 a	 reductive,
naïve	 objectivism,	with	 its	 cynical	 dismissal	 of	 ethical	 and	 rational	 norms:	 the	 choice	was
between	“the	downfall	of	Europe	in	its	estrangement	from	its	own	rational	sense	of	life”	and
“the	rebirth	of	Europe	from	the	spirit	of	philosophy.”4
In	 speaking	 of	 this	 crisis,	 Husserl	 urged	 a	 return	 to	 the	 Greek	 spirit,	 especially	 in	 its
rejection	of	sophistry.	He	paints	Socrates	as	defending	the	ethical	life	against	the	sophists	who
had,	“through	their	subjectivism,	confused	and	corrupted	general	moral	convictions.”5	Socrates
did	not	just	defend	the	presophistic	status	quo,	of	course,	but	responded	to	sophistry	by	trying
to	raise	humanity	to	a	new	level,	insisting	on	the	need	for	human	beings	to	live	out	a	radical,
self-critiquing	search	for	justification	and	insight	in	ethical	life.	Husserl	paints	Plato	as	further
defending	this	radical	Socratic	dedication	to	ethical	truth	and	self-responsibility	by	responding
to	 the	sophistic	“anti-scientific	skepticism”;	namely,	Plato	did	 this	by	developing	philosophy
as	 a	 science,	 as	 theoretical	 knowledge,	 and	 by	 developing	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 “the
communal	 life”	 or	 “man	 writ	 large”	 defends	 “the	 rational	 individual	 life.”6	 In	 these	 ways,
philosophy	becomes	in	some	sense	the	foundation	for	a	reasonable	and	genuinely	human	life,
individually	and	communally.7
When	 concluding	 the	 1910	 “Philosophy	 as	 a	 Rigorous	 Science,”	 after	 refuting	 the
skeptical	pseudoscientific	reductions	of	reason	by	naturalism,	psychologism,	and	historicism,
Husserl	 turns	 to	 discuss	 worldviews	 and	 philosophy.	 He	 rejects	 what	 we	 might	 call
worldviewism,	 the	claim	 linked	especially	 to	historicism	 that	one’s	 reason	 is	determined	by
one’s	 or	 the	 epoch’s	 view	of	 the	world.	But	 he	 does	 not	 deny	 that	worldview	 is	 something
influential	over	the	way	we	think,	and	even	a	positive	something,	since	in	its	best	sense	it	 is
wise.	 He	 then	 discusses	 worldview	 philosophy,	 which	 is	 the	 attempt	 by	 thinkers	 to	 give	 a
worldview	grand	theoretical	clarity	and	depth.	We	need	wisdom	in	the	world,	good	practical
judgment	shaped	by	experience	and	informed	by	a	sense	of	the	puzzles	of	human	life	and	the
cosmos.	The	attempts	to	deepen	and	make	consistent	such	thought	are	worthwhile.
Here	 Husserl	 recognizes	 a	 service	 played	 by	 such	 thought,	 he	 just	 denies	 that	 it	 is
philosophy	 in	 the	proper,	 scientific	sense.	He	 implies	 that,	 though	such	 thought	may	be	more
urgent,	it	is	“from	certain	points	of	view”	less	important	than	true	philosophy.8	To	try	to	turn
worldview	reflection	into	philosophy	in	his	radical	and	proper	sense	is	to	give	in	to	our	age’s
“fanaticism”	 about	 science,	 and	 would	 manage	 only	 to	 sacrifice	 real	 philosophizing	 for	 a
proliferation	of	worldview-filled	wise	men.9	Here	belongs	Husserl’s	comment	 to	his	student
Aron	Gurwitsch:	“There	are	philosophers	aplenty.	Someone	must	do	the	dirty	work—that	is	me
and	 you.”10	 Worldview	 philosophy	 must	 take	 positions	 without	 radical	 ground,	 whereas
philosophy	 must	 work	 slowly,	 from	 the	 ground	 up,	 seeking	 truth	 with	 justification	 and
understanding.	“For	the	sake	of	time,	we	must	not	sacrifice	eternity.”11	Even	those	thinkers	who
have	given	history	its	highest	worldviews,	he	comments,	did	so	because	they	were	aiming	for
philosophy	as	knowledge.
In	1919,	 an	 admiring	and	critical	young	 thinker,	Arnold	Metzger,	who	 later	became	his
personal	assistant,	wrote	to	Husserl	and	included	several	writings,	including	Phänomenologie
der	Revolution,	which	was	a	“critique	of	philosophies	which	become	ideologies	defending	a
bankrupt	social	order”	and	a	“quest	for	genuine	ideals	of	humanity	which	can	serve	as	a	basis
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for	social	rebirth.”12	Husserl	responded	in	a	long	letter	urging	the	young	man	to	study	with	him.
He	 encouraged	 Metzger	 while	 deeply	 and	 sharply	 disagreeing	 with	 him:	 “I	 cannot	 help
doubting	 and	 even	 definitely	 rejecting	much	 of	what	 you	 say.”13	 Husserl	 praised	Metzger’s
idealism	and	“ethical	maximalism,”	his	desire	to	renew	mankind	by	reminding	it	of	true	ideals,
and	his	“critical	examination”	of	Marxism,	naturalism,	positivism,	and	any	other	attempt	to	rob
human	life	of	worthy	ideals,	but	Husserl	also	marks	some	deep	disagreements.14
In	addition	to	trying	to	correct	Metzger’s	interpretation	of	his	transcendental	turn,	Husserl
insisted	 on	 a	 kind	 of	 practical	 difference	 between	 them.	Husserl	was	 clearly	moved	 by	 the
young	man’s	dedication	 to	 ideals	 and	 to	 the	 imperative	of	 improving	culture	and	politics.	 In
fact,	 in	the	letter	Husserl	 identifies	the	point	of	his	whole	life	and	philosophy	as,	 in	a	sense,
serving	 this	 improvement	of	humanity,	 and	he	denies	 that	 scientific	 truth	 is	 the	 fulfillment	of
human	life.	Still,	Husserl	backs	off	of	politics	and	of	any	direct	political	use	of	philosophy.	He
says,	 contrasting	Metzger	 to	himself,	 “you	are	 a	man	of	 action	by	vocation	and	preference.”
Though	driven	by	the	same	radical	ethical	and	philosophical	concerns	as	Husserl,	Metzger’s
theoretically	informed	political	striving	needs	more,	and	better,	philosophy	first:	“then	comes
the	 demanding	 task	 already	 attributed	 to	 you,	 the	 study	 of	 human	 realities	 and	 their
philosophical	guidance.”
This	is	not	my	task;	I	am	not	called	to	lead	humanity	in	striving	for	happy	life.	I	had	to	acknowledge	this	in	the	sorrowful
course	of	my	war	years:	my	daimonion	warned	me.	I	live	consciously	and	by	choice	purely	as	a	scientific	philosopher	(I
have	written	no	books	concerning	 the	war,	 since	 I	 regarded	 that	 as	a	pretentious	philosophical	ostentation).	Not	 that	 I
consider	truth	and	science	the	highest	values.	Quite	the	contrary,	“Intellect	is	the	servant	of	the	will,”	and	so	also	I	am
the	servant	of	those	who	shape	our	practical	life,	of	the	leaders	of	humanity.—Naturally,	you	will	not	want	to	accept	this
apportioning	of	 functions	as	valid.	You	are	young,	 and	 full	of	 the	overflowing	consciousness	of	your	 strength;	you	 still
believe	that	you	can	and	must	attempt	both	functions.	But	as	long	as	God	preserves	you	in	the	Socratic	dedication	and	in
the	radicalism	of	truthful	life,	your	daimonion	will	speak	to	you	at	the	right	time.15
Husserl	then	adds	a	warning,	because	genuine	philosophy	is	harder	than	it	seems.
The	will	 is	 subject	 to	 the	norms	of	 truth,	namely,	 the	 true	good,	and	seeking	 truth	 in	 its
fullness	 is	 an	 ethical	 task,	 but	Husserl	 suggests	 here	 that	 scientific	 truth	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for
good	practical	decisions,	and	that	the	scientific	life	should	not	be	confused	with	the	active	life
of	political	leadership.
In	his	1923-24	articles	for	the	Japanese	journal	Kaizo,	Husserl	expresses	the	need	for	a
reorientation	 of	 culture	 and	 values.	 He	 makes	 two	 points	 in	 the	 first	 of	 these	 articles,
“Renewal:	 Its	 Problem	 and	 Method,”	 key	 to	 understanding	 his	 approach	 to	 philosophy,
politics,	and	ideology.
First,	 he	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 type	 of	 rationalization	 of	 the	 universe	 done	 by	 the
natural	sciences,	which	explain	by	appealing	to	causes,	and	the	rationalization	to	be	done	with
the	help	of	 the	 spiritual	 sciences,	which	can	explain	by	pointing	 toward	norms	according	 to
which	humans	as	free	and	rational	animals	should	motivate	themselves.	Because	human	thought
is	 subject	 to	 norms,	 and	 not	 merely	 the	 play	 thing	 of	 (psychological,	 economic,	 political,
historical,	 etc.)	 forces,	 the	 human	 sciences	must	 not	 ape	 the	 natural	 sciences	 in	methods	 or
aims.	 Real	 cultural	 renewal,	 a	 movement	 toward	 a	 more	 genuinely	 human	 life,	 requires
scientific	philosophy	of	the	human	person,	community,	and	reason.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 L
ex
in
gt
on
 B
oo
ks
. A
ll r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Scientific	philosophy	must	help	us	understand	 the	essential	 structures	of	human	 life	and
the	 world,	 but	 it	 must	 also	 articulate	 the	 normative	 ideals	 of	 reason,	 and	 in	 this	 way	 lead
humanity	toward	a	higher	life.	Though	sometimes	Husserl	is	too	naïve	in	his	statement	of	this
kingly	 role	of	philosophers,	we	should	perhaps	understand	his	vision	as	something	 like	 this:
natural	 scientists	 seem	 to	 be	 in	 our	 time	 admired	 as	 the	 paradigm	 of	 reason	 and	 as	 the
articulators	of	the	ideals	of	the	rational	life,	and	Husserl	believes	this	role	should	be	filled	by
those	 who	 are	 dedicated	 to	 reason	 in	 its	 radicalness,	 breadth,	 and	 normative	 power—
philosophers.	As	he	 says	 later,	 the	 “prosperity”	of	positive	 sciences	has	blinded	us	 and	has
“meant	 an	 indifferent	 turning-away	 from	 the	 questions	 which	 are	 decisive	 for	 a	 genuine
humanity.	 Merely	 fact-minded	 sciences	 make	 merely	 fact-minded	 people.”16	 Husserl’s	 is
simultaneously	a	call	 to	culture	at	large	to	reorient	itself	toward	a	fuller	sense	of	reason	and
also	a	call	to	philosophers	to	do	so,	and	thereby	to	serve	culture,	not	by	doing	something	other
than	philosophy,	but	precisely	by	being	better	philosophers.17
Though	 the	 first	 point	 from	 the	 “Renewal”	 essay	worth	 emphasis	 here	 is	 that	 scientific
philosophy	is	needed	in	order	to	move	toward	a	truly	human,	reasonable	life,	individually	and
communally,	the	second	is	that	scientific	philosophy	is	limited	in	its	ability	to	help	us	live	in
practical	 reason.	 Though	 at	 other	 times	 he	 seems	 to	 overstate	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a
philosophical	 renewal	 for	 a	 cultural	 renewal,	 here	 Husserl	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 a	 proper
philosophy	is	needed,	but	not	enough.	Whereas	“the	merely	empirical	sciences	of	man…cannot
offer	us	what	we	need	in	our	striving	for	renewal,”	the	proper	“helper”	of	this	renewal	is	an
actual	 understanding	 of	 what	 human	 spirituality—in	 its	 individual,	 social,	 political,	 and
cultural	dimensions—essentially	is,	can	be,	and	should	seek	to	be.18	A	scientific	philosophy	of
human	 life	 provides	 “preparatory	 theoretical	work”	 for	 the	 reasonable	 renewal	 of	 culture.19
And	 again,	 reflecting	 on	 the	 failure	 of	 philosophy	 so	 far	 to	 provide	 an	 understanding	 of	 the
essential	structures	and	norms	of	human	life,	Husserl	asks,
What	should	we	do?	Should	we	again	proceed,	as	in	political	matters	when,	for	instance,	as	citizens	we	prepare	to	vote?
Are	 we	 supposed	 to	 judge	 only	 according	 to	 instinct	 and	 inclination,	 according	 to	 assumption	 we	 tend	 to	 overlook?
Actions	like	these	may	be	perfectly	justified	if	the	day	comes	on	which	such	a	decision	is	required,	and	with	it	the	action
is	completed.	But	in	our	case	there	is	a	concern	for	a	temporal	infinity	and	for	the	eternal	in	the	temporal—the	future	of
mankind,	the	genesis	of	a	true	humanity—for	which	we	still	feel	ourselves	responsible.20
The	 task	 of	 the	 philosopher	 is	 in	 certain	 respects	 more	 important	 but	 less	 urgent	 in
addressing	the	cultural	crisis.	It	is	more	kingly,	but	less	forceful.	It	reaches	in	more	deeply	but
cuts	less	directly	than	politics.	It	invests	for	centuries,	but	does	not	solve	the	pressing	practical
problems	of	today	and	tomorrow.
Some	 have	 accused	 Husserl	 of	 presenting	 an	 ultimately	 anarchist	 political	 philosophy,
because	when	he	describes	the	ideal	human	community—the	“genuine	humanity”	for	which	his
philosophy	 feels	 responsible—it	 is	 not	 a	 political	 community.	 The	 question	 remains21	 how
various	 types	 of	 political	 community	 could	 help	 or	 hinder	 the	 development	 toward	 such	 a
perfect	“community	of	 love,”	an	 ideal	and	 infinitely	distant,	multi-	and	super-national	human
life.	Still,	this	ideal	is	in	itself	not	political.	That	is	just	to	say,	for	Husserl,	human	being	would
find	its	highest	earthly	culmination	in	a	truly	ethical,	reasonable,	and	love-infused	personal	and
communally	shared	life;	government	is	not	the	point	or	the	fulfillment,	but	a	servant	of	this	life,
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and	how	it	can	serve	this	life	seems	to	be	mostly	a	matter	of	prudence.	This	prudence	can	and
should	be	informed	by	scientific	philosophy’s	elucidation	of	the	essential	structures	of	human
life	and	community,	and	should	be	inspired	by	the	norms	of	reason	and	ethics	that	philosophy
can	help	articulate.	Still,	he	implies,	philosophy	seems	neither	called	nor	able	to	supplant	this
prudence,	 the	wisdom	needed	 to	 serve	human	 fulfillment	 politically	 in	 the	 human	 space	 that
must	remain	under	of	this	ideal.
Husserl	did	not	confront	political	ideologies	directly.	This	came	partly	from	a	decision	to
protect	 what	 was	 most	 important	 in	 his	 work.	 This	 seems	 to	 me	 a	 wise	 tactical	 move.
Philosophies	 are	 too	often	 either	 expropriated	or	 attacked	by	political	movements.	The	best
political	thought	to	come	out	of	his	students	has	partly	arisen	from	the	conviction	that	there	is	a
reality	to	human	beings	deeper	than	politics	and	a	calling	of	human	beings	far	beyond	politics.
Zdzisław	 Krasnodębski	 comments,	 for	 example,	 that	 it	 was	 the	 very	 apolitical	 nature	 of
phenomenology	that	attracted	philosophers	behind	the	Iron	Curtain	to	it,	since	in	a	totalitarian
situation	being	unpolitical	is	a	most	powerful	and	subversive	political	statement.22	Naturally—
but	ironically,	from	the	point	of	view	of	politics—this	conviction	seems	necessary	for	a	decent
politics.	 Politics	 has	 nothing	 to	 serve	 apart	 from	 itself	 unless	 we	 preserve	 and	 honor
nonpolitical	 human	 goods.	 In	 philosophy	 it	 is	 a	 mistake	 and	 in	 practical	 politics	 it	 is	 a
mishandling	of	our	situation	to	make	too	much	of	politics.
The	“apportioning	of	functions”	Husserl	wrote	about	to	Metzger	seems	to	follow	from	an
important	 insight,	 an	 insight	 that	 gives	 political	 reason	 an	 incomplete	 but	 real	 independence
from	 the	 philosophical	 task	 of	 securing	 scientific	 knowledge	 about	 essential	 structures	 of
human	life,	valid	but	far	off	ideals,	and	universal	a	priori	 truths.	It	 is	an	insight	that	respects
non-philosophical	 knowledge	 and	 authority.	 It	 therefore	 protects	 the	 world	 of	 human	 living
from	experts	with	a	“scientific”	theory,	aping	the	natural	sciences,	about	how	the	human	world
“really”	works.
Husserl’s	most	important	insight	in	political	philosophy	seems	to	be	a	distinction	between
politics	 and	 philosophy.	 This	 seems	 to	 me	 a	 crucial	 point.	 It	 is	 not	 an	 error	 from	 within
chemistry	 to	 think	 that	 chemistry	 can	 solve	 all	 human	 problems.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 effect	 of	 a
psychological	 defect	 that	 some	 psychologists	 think	 that	 human	 beliefs	 are	 all	 explained
psychologically.	 These	 are	 philosophical	 errors.	 It	 is	 a	 political	 mistake,	 in	 addition	 to	 a
philosophical	error,	terrible	and	too	common,	to	elevate	politics	to	the	point	of	life	or	political
thought	to	the	highest	human	knowledge,	to	think	that	politics	can	solve	all	human	problems	or
that	our	beliefs	are	all	determined	politically.	It	does	not	complete	a	political	philosophy,	but	it
is	a	good	start,	to	distinguish	between	politics	and	philosophy.	Likewise,	it	is	a	philosophical
mistake	 to	 presume	 philosophy	 replaces	 rather	 than	 elucidates,	 elevates,	 and	 protects	 non-
philosophical	 life.	 Though	 we	 should	 wish	 that	 this	 great	 thinker	 reflected	 more	 on	 the
structures	of	political	life,	we	should	be	grateful	for	what	he	has	left	us	and	thankful	that	he	at
least	did	not	make	these	mistakes.
Ideologism
And	what	of	the	rationality	of	that	irrationalism	which	is	so	much	vaunted	and	expected	of	us?	Does	it	not	have
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to	convince	us,	if	we	are	expected	to	listen	to	it,	with	rational	considerations	and	reasons?	Is	its	irrationality	not
finally	rather	a	narrow-minded	and	bad	rationality?23
In	 “Science	 as	 a	Vocation,”	Max	Weber	 argues	 that	 values	 should	 be	 left	 out	 of	 a	 teacher’s
lessons.	The	student	turns	to	the	teacher	not	as	a	partisan	prophet,	a	worldview	preacher,	or	a
lifecoach,	but	to	teach	what	is	known	about	some	subject.	It	is	wrong	to	transform	the	lectern
into	a	pulpit	or	platform.
Science	is	a	matter	of	facts,	known	truths,	whereas	values	for	Weber	are	not	a	matter	of
reason—or	of	unreason.	They	are	not	knowable,	but	result	from	personal	decision,	from	one’s
ultimate	position	to	life.	To	disagree	with	Weber,	one	must	disagree	somehow	with	the	way	he
characterizes	facts	and	values.	It	 is	a	naïve	distinction,	and	the	cynical	rejection	of	 it	claims
that	the	facts	are	as	much	up	for	grabs	and	in	need	of	a	personal	decision	as	values.	If	we	think
following	Weber,	but	reject	his	distinction	in	this	cynical	way,	then	what	he	fears	most	comes
to	pass	more	than	ever.	Facts	would	be	putty	in	the	hands	of	a	worldview,	and	teachers	would
not	be	able	to	be	anything	other	than	prophets	or	activists.
In	 short,	 the	 particular	 danger	 to	 teaching	 and	 learning	 that	 I	 wish	 to	 discuss	 with
Husserl’s	 help	 is	 ideologism.	 This	 is	 its	 danger:	 it	 transforms	 teaching	 and	 learning	 from	 a
truth-approaching	 activity	 to	 a	 prejudice-,	 preference-,	 and	 worldview-infecting	 process.
Ideologism	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 all	 people	 have	 an	 ideology:	 all	 people	 are	 adherents	 of	 some
system	of	fundamental	beliefs	that	(1)	determines	their	other	beliefs,	in	the	sense	that	it	(2)	is
the	interpretive	framework	by	which	they	understand	any	thing	or	state	of	affairs,	and	thus	that
(3)	 is	 not	 susceptible	 of	 evidence	 (because	 it	 is	 the	 interpretive	 framework	 for	 all	 possible
evidence).
Grand	ideologies	are	no	longer	stylish,	but	ideologism	is	quite	popular.	Its	presence	in	a
student’s	 mind	 blocks	 true	 learning,	 and	 because	 it	 gives	 a	 prose-cutorial	 immunity	 to	 any
person’s	ideology	of	choice,	it	invites	a	teacher	to	become	an	agitator.
In	order	to	recover	teaching	and	learning	as	truth-relevant	activities,	we	must	destroy	this
ism	of	 isms.	Husserl’s	 “Philosophy	 as	 a	Rigorous	Science”	 is	 directed	 at	 various	 doctrines
(naturalism,	psychologism,	historicism,	worldviewism)	that	reject	the	person’s	ability	to	get	to
truth,	so	we	start	there.
Husserl	 attacks	 intellectual	 ideologies,	 always	 in	 defense	 of	 the	 ability	 of	 mind	 to
transcend	 itself.	 Psychologism	 claims	 that	 beliefs	 are	 caught	 in	 a	 system	 of	 causally
determining	 psychological	 laws.	 Naturalism	 claims	 that	 all	 things—including	 beliefs	 and
values—are	nature	in	the	sense	asserted	by	modern	natural	science,	quantified	matter	governed
by	exact	laws.	Historicism	claims	that	beliefs	are	produced	by	historical	milieu.	This	pattern
appears	in	many	varieties.	Also	common	is	the	sociologistic	version,	claiming	that	beliefs	are
determined	 by	 social	 or	 socioeconomic	 status.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 sexist	 version,	 a	 genderist
version,	 a	 racist	 version,	 a	 psychoanalytic	 version,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 common	 factor	 is	 the
assignment	of	causes	where	reasons	are	supposed	to	be	capable	of	operating.	For	some	reason,
since	Husserl’s	 time	until	 now,	 these	 anti-intellectual	 ideologies	 have	been	 très	chic	 among
intellectuals.
Husserl’s	 disproof	 of	 such	 skeptical	 claims	 is	 to	 show	 that	 they	 are	 self-defeating,
“counter-sense.”	In	each	case,	the	belief	asserting	the	causal	claim	that	all	beliefs	are	caused
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by	such	and	such	should	also	be	caused	by	such	and	such,	in	which	case	the	assertion	must	lack
reasons.	Husserl	likes	to	remind	us	here	of	basic	logic	rules.	Such	truths	would	not	afford	our
insight	 (and	 we	 could	 not	 think	 at	 all)	 if	 all	 beliefs	 were	 determined	 as	 dominos	 in	 some
pattern	of	events.	A	“radical	subjective	skepticism”	about	logic	is	absurd	because	it	denies	to
logical	 principles	 their	 role	 as	 ideals	 presiding	 over	 thought,	 and	 even	 (often	 enough,
especially)	the	people	attempting	to	deny	them	appeal	to	ideals	of	reason,	and	must.
In	urging	others	to	render	tribute	to	whatever	reduction	you	fancy,	you	must	pay	them	in
reasons,	but	any	appeal	you	make	to	principles	for	consistent	thinking	robs	your	conclusion	of
its	 currency	 and	 meaning.	 To	 argue	 for	 the	 despotism	 of	 force	 over	 thought,	 one	 must	 pay
homage	to	the	sovereignty	of	reason	and	the	liberty	of	the	mind.
Any	reason-giving	for	these	claims	begs	the	question	against	such	claims	that	mind	is	not
open	to	reasons.	The	man	who	asserts,	in	communication,	such	a	proposition	is	performing	the
intellectual	version	of	mutually	assured	destruction,	though	he	doesn’t	know	it.
But	equally,	any	reason-giving	against	these	claims	begs	the	question.	The	best	we	can	do
to	disprove	such	a	claim	 is	point	out	 to	ourselves	and	 to	anyone	else	around	 that	 this	man’s
position	 (proposition)	 destroys	his	 own	position	 (ground)	 as	 truth-claimer	 and	 reason-giver.
We	then	want	to	appreciate—and	I	mean,	not	just	notice,	but	also	wonder	at	and	be	 thankful
for—the	fact	that	mind	is	open	to	evidence.
These	isms	have	a	common	factor—the	claim	that	ideas	are	not	ideas	but	something	else.
Husserl’s	 accusation	 of	 self-refutation	 against	 them	 is	 decisive,	 but	 a	 negative	 and	 not	 a
positive	victory.	His	entire	philosophical	career,	 the	key	moves	he	makes	 in	establishing	 the
phenomenological	movement,	 is	 the	positive	 response,	because	 it	 elucidates	 the	openness	of
the	mind	 to	 the	world	and	 thereby	helps	us	 see	 the	absurdity	 in	denying	 that	 the	mind	 is	 the
mind,	and	not	something	else.
Husserl	makes	several	basic	moves	that	help	us	reopen	the	space	of	reason	in	an	age	of
cynical	skepticism:
(a)	By	 its	nature,	 the	mind	 is	essentially	open	and	 receptive	 to	other	 things.	This	 is	his
celebrated	doctrine	of	 intentionality,	a	small	 thing	with	deep	 implications.	We	are	not	aware
merely	 of	 our	 own	 creations,	 our	 images	 or	 concepts.	 We	 are	 aware	 of	 things	 other	 than
ourselves.
(b)	He	urges	us	 to	 return	 to	 the	 things	 themselves	 for	 their	 truths.	Against	 systems	of	a
priori	hypothesizing,	against	“top	down”	thinking	that	imagines	it	can	tell	us	how	things	must
be	in	abstraction	from	our	encounters	with	them,	Husserl	insists	that	thought	finds	its	telos	and
becomes	authentic	in	the	insightful	presence	of	the	objects	about	which	we	think.
(c)	 He	 reasserts	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 world	 of	 human	 experience.	 Because,	 even	 pre-
philosophically,	 mind	 encounters	 things,	 he	 defends	 the	 everyday	 reason	 operative	 in
pretheoretical	 life.	 The	 mind’s	 encounter	 with	 the	 world	 is	 not	 invented	 by	 philosophy.
Intentionality,	mind’s	openness	to	and	interest	in	the	things	themselves,	didn’t	go	comatose	in
the	 modern	 era,	 even	 though	 many	 philosophers	 stopped	 believing	 in	 it.	 This	 is	 the	 major
reason	 moderns	 discount	 the	 commonly	 assumed	 world	 and	 the	 reason	 operative	 in	 it.	 In
contrast,	Husserl	insists	that,	while	episteme	[science]	is	higher	than	doxa	[opinion],	the	higher
levels	build	on	and	cannot	replace	the	lower	level.
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Teaching	is	supposed	to	be	a	guiding	of	students	to	learn,	and	learning	means	gaining	and
deepening	one’s	understanding	of	the	world,	oneself,	and	beyond.	What	are	the	conditions	of
the	 possibility	 of	 authentic	 teaching?	 That	 there	 is	 a	 truth	 about	 things	 and	 that	 we	 can
encounter	things	in	their	truth.	That	the	realm	of	things	themselves	shows	up	to	us,	teachers	and
students,	in	common,	so	that	we	can	talk	about	it.	That	the	student	doesn’t	start	from	nowhere,
but	starts	with	prior,	valid	though	less	perfect,	contact	with	the	truth	of	things.
Husserl	 is	 a	 teacher	who	 leads	 us	 to	 see	 that	 these	 theses	 are	 not	 ungrounded,	merely
hopeful	 hypotheses.	 They	 follow	 from	 the	 nature	 of	 our	 situation—that	 we	 find	 ourselves
together,	minded,	and	in	the	world.
An	Husserlian	Contribution	 to	Political	Philosophy:	Naturalism	and	 other
Ideologies
“We	must	also	allow	relative	evidences.	Otherwise	we	dissolve	life.”24
Husserl	 also	 teaches	 us	 how	 to	 understand	 those	 systems	 of	 assertions	 that	would	 deny	 our
situation.	One	of	his	most	important,	and	original,	analyses	is	of	the	naturalistic	attitude.	I	shall
argue	 that	 this	 analysis	 should	 be	 extended	 by	 analogy	 to	 help	 us	 understand	 ideology
generally.	About	naturalism,	he	makes	two	main	claims:
(1)	 Everyday	 prephilosophical	 intentionality	 (Husserl’s	 “natural”	 attitude	 or
“personalistic”	attitude)	does	its	job	too	well,	though	of	course	fallibly:	it	sees	the	world,	but
it	 is	 invisible	 to	 itself,	 it	 lacks	 self-knowledge.	The	naturalistic	 attitude	 attempts	 to	 abstract
from	 all	 subject-relative	 characteristics	 of	 the	 world—for	 example,	 values,	 culture,
prejudices,	 sensations.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 overcome	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 common	 human
subjectivity,	 it	digs	 in	deeper	on	self-forgetfulness.	 It	 is	hyperaware	of	how	 the	activities	of
consciousness	 skew	 others’	 beliefs,	 but	 it	 is	more	 thoroughly	 unaware	 of	 its	 own	 fallibility
because	 it	 pretends	 to	 have	 escaped	 subjectivity.	 The	 naturalistic	 attitude	 may	 acquire	 an
expansionist	disdain	for	everyday	experience	and	dismiss	its	accomplishments.	When	it	does
so,	 it	claims	to	uncover	 the	“true”	world	beneath	the	world	of	experience,	and	to	dismiss	as
false	 subjective	 construction	 the	 world	 as	 experienced	 and	 understood	 by	 common	 human
sensibility,	thought,	and	culture.
(2)	The	 naturalistic	 attitude	 operates	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 physical	 things	 are	 ideally
mathematical	and	perfectly	determined	by	laws	we	can	formalize	mathematically.	We	never	in
fact	come	across	 ideally	 flat	planes,	perfect	 spheres,	or	 falling	objects	 immune	 to	 incidental
friction.	 In	 fact	 we	 know	 that	 concrete	 things	 cannot	 fulfill	 these	 geometrical	 ideals.	 But
Galileo’s	 theories	 about	 freefalling	 objects	 speak	 as	 though	 the	 boards	 and	 balls	 of	 his
experiment	instantiate	this	ideal	realm	and	obey	perfectly	laws	formulated	in	its	terms.
In	 sum,	 the	 naturalistic	 attitude	 involves	 us	 in	 two	 abstractions:	 it	 abstracts	 away	 the
human	 involvement	 in	 the	 world	 and	 abstracts	 away	 the	 non-ideal	 concreteness	 and
irregularities	 of	 things.	 Theorists	 adopting	 the	 naturalistic	 attitude	 commit	 the	 fallacy	 of
misplaced	 concreteness,	 and	 undermine	 their	 own	 ground,	 if	 they	 assert	 that	 this	 method
captures	 wholly	 the	 one	 true	 world	 and	 provides	 an	 etiology	 of	 the	 merely	 subjective
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experiences	of	prescientific	life.
When	 these	 abstractions	 are	 applied	 to	 ideas	 and	 the	 life	 of	 reason,	 theorizing	persons
taking	up	the	naturalistic	attitude	cut	off	their	legs—or,	more	aptly,	close	up	their	eyes	and	ears
and	 minds:	 since	 the	 naturalistic	 attitude	 abstracts	 from	 human	 meaning	 and	 subjective
experience,	it	cannot	make	sense	of	these	as	what	they	are.	It	is	by	making	this	reifying,	self-
referential	 move	 of	 trying	 to	 causally	 explain	 acts	 of	 reason,	 which	 must	 after	 all	 include
scientific	 theorizing,	 that	 natural	 science	 warps	 itself	 into	 a	 self-refuting	 naturalistic
dogmatism.	 It	 is	 the	reification	of	mind	and	 its	 ideas	and	 laws	 that	 results	 in	 the	 ideological
character	of	naturalism	and	of	other	ideologies.
Naturalism	 is	 the	 ideological	 evil	 twin	 of	 natural	 science,	 and	 is	 only	 one	 example.
Ideology	 is	 usually	 about	 more	 properly	 human	 things:	 about	 politics,	 culture,	 religion,
morality,	 etc.	 But	 other	 ideologies	 approach	 these	 phenomena	 with	 analogous	 dual
abstractions.	(1)	Ideology	dismisses	pre-theoretical	ideas	about	how	the	human	world	works.
It	 tries	 to	 explain	 the	 human	 things	 of	 ethics	 and	 politics	 in	 formulas,	 imagining	 that	 it	 has
discovered	 a	 telescope	 that	 sees	 around,	 and	 no	 longer	 through,	 normal	 human	 eyes.	 (2)
Ideology	 speaks	 as	 though	 people	 fulfilled	 a	 theoretical	 ideal.	Not	 only	 are	we	 pushed	 into
being	merely	instances	of	an	ideal	type	governed	by	simplified	laws,	so	that	our	irregularities
are	 smoothed	 away	 to	 fit	 into	 the	 theory,	 but	 also	 usually	 ideologies	 abstract	 away	 some
particular	necessary	feature	of	human	nature	(for	example,	that	we	must	know	and	care	about
certain	 people	 more	 than	 others,	 or	 that	 not	 all	 goods	 can	 be	 measured	monetarily,	 or	 that
persons	bear	responsibility	for	their	actions	and	products	despite	the	social	structures	they	find
themselves	within).
I	 suggest	 these	 are	 the	 essential	 features	 of	 ideology.	 That	 ideologues	 are	 closed	 to
counter-evidence	 is	 the	 first	 property	 flowing	 from	 this	 essence.	 Someone	 in	 the	 grip	 of	 an
ideology	cannot	appreciate	and	weigh	evidence	contrary	 to	 their	overall	 theory	because	 they
start	by	 rejecting	 the	validity	of	normal	evidence	and	believe	 their	 fundamental	 theory	about
what	 is	 “really”	 going	 on	morally	 or	 politically	 explains	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 appearances,	 the
false	consciousness,	of	those	who	do	not	accept	their	system.
This	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	way	 a	 conspiracy	 theory	works.	A	conspiracy	 theory	 involves
two	allegations:	 the	primary	crime	and	 the	cover-up.	A	conspiracy	 theory	becomes	a	closed
system,	not	open	to	public	reason	and	disproof,	when	any	evidence	that	does	not	support	 the
primary	accusation	is	taken	to	support	the	cover-up	allegation.	This	creates	an	unchallengeable
interpretive	 framework.	 Ideologies	 can	 work	 as	 complete	 explanations	 and	 closed
interpretative	 frameworks	 only	 because	 they	 discount	 the	 evidence	 offered	 in	 common	 to
human	 beings.	 In	 order	 to	 permanently	 and	 rationally	 trump	 the	 conflicting,	 imperfect,	 and
unclear	opinions	that	dominate	the	human	realm,	ideologies	begin	by	discounting	the	concrete
world	of	pre-theoretical	life.
It	 is	not	just	coincidence	that	ideologies	share	this	structure	with	naturalism	of	rejecting
the	obvious,	experienced	world	and	constructing	a	new	and	neater	one.	Ideologies	take	on	this
structure	because	they	ape	naturalism.	This	seems	to	be	because	the	natural	sciences	provide	in
our	culture	the	model	of	how	to	theorize.	And	like	naturalism,	ideologies	generally	must	start
with	the	notion	that	the	real	world	is	not	the	one	available	to	common	human	opinion	and	with
the	correlate	notion	 that	human	opinion	 too	must	be	explained	by	 this	 real	world	 that	 their
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story	maps	 by	 identifying	 its	 basic	 objects	 and	 laws.	 It	 is	 fundamental	 to	 naturalism	 and	 to
other	 ideologies	 to	deny	 that	 our	 basic	 experiences	 are	 truthful,	 however	 inadequate,	 and	 to
claim,	 instead,	 that	 they	 are	 things,	 causes	 and	 effects,	 explainable	 like	 things.	 But	 the	 real
world	they	map	is	in	truth	a	theoretically	constructed	world,	and	it	must	be	an	absurd	one	to	the
extent	 that	 they	deny	that	pre-theoretical	evidence	grounds	and	can	correct	 the	account.	After
all,	 if	 the	 real	 world	 were	 not	 given,	 however	 imperfectly,	 in	 basic	 human	 experience,	 no
amount	of	our	theorizing	could	get	us	there.	And	if	the	mind	and	its	reasoning	were	drained	of
their	 veracity	 and	 unmasked	 as	 merely	 thingly	 effects	 of	 something	 else,	 as	 this	 type	 of
theorizing	presumes,	no	amount	of	reason-giving	and	evidence-finding	could	move	us	toward
the	truth.
Ideology	originally	was	to	be	the	“scientific”	psychological	explanation	of	human	ideas.
Ideologies,	 in	 the	 pejorative	 contemporary	 sense,	 always	 involve	 a	 moment	 of	 the
pseudoscientific	 reification	 and	 explanation	 of	 our	 beliefs.	 They	 attempt	 to	 dismiss	 normal
human	 experience,	 to	 deprive	 it	 of	 its	 validity,	 in	 order	 to	 put	 some	 idealized	 system	 in	 its
place.	 The	 response	 to	 ideology	must	 be	 a	 true	 study	 of	 ideas,	 one	 that	 lets	 ideas	 be	 ideas
rather	than	turning	them	into	things	to	be	explained	away	and	controlled.
Aurel	Kolnai	writes	 that	Husserl’s	Experience	 and	 Judgment	 “propounds	 a	 grandiose
vista	 of	 absolute	 anti-Cartesianism:	 the	 discovery,	 as	 original	 as	 it	 is	 epoch-making,	 but
Aristotelian	 in	 spirit,	 that	 our	 valid	 and	 strict	 ‘scientific’	 or	 ‘philosophical’	 knowledge
proceeds,	not	from	a	‘minimum’	knowledge	of	certain	and	evident	truth,	but	from	our	inexplicit
world	 knowledge	 in	 all	 its	wealth,	manifoldness	 and	 implication	 of	 order.”25	 Husserl	 often
says	 that	 philosophy	 must	 be	 a	 presuppositionless	 science	 and	 that	 it,	 as	 first	 philosophy,
provides	foundations	for	the	rest	of	human	knowledge,	everyday	as	well	as	scientific.	But,	as
Kolnai	saw	clearly,	phenomenology	fulfills	this	Cartesian-sounding	mission	in	an	unCartesian
way.	It	provides	a	foundation	for	knowledge	by	reflecting	upon	and	understanding	it,	such	that
it	can	defend	this	nonphilosophical	knowledge	while	also	deepening	and	elevating	it.	And	this
is	true	of	empirical	as	well	as	moral	and	practical	knowledge.	This	is	why	Husserl	can	present
his	philosophy	as	reasserting	the	rights	of	doxa,	opinion.	“Essentially	the	path	of	knowledge	is
to	 ascend	 from	 doxa	 to	 epistēmē—it	 is	 simply	 that	 even	 concerning	 this	 ultimate	 goal,	 the
origin	and	specific	rights	of	the	lower	stages	should	not	be	forgotten.”26
Kolnai	points	especially	 to	sections	seven	to	 ten	of	Experience	and	Judgment.27	While
not	giving	up	on	the	claim	that	episteme	really	does	go	beyond	everyday	doxa,	Husserl	insists
that	knowledge	builds	upon	it	and	cannot	therefore	reject	the	realm	of	opinion.	Naturalism	and
scientistic	 human	 sciences	 seem	 to	 claim	 that	 they	 discover	 the	 true,	 exact,	 and	 causally
explained	world	behind	 the	merely	 false	 show	of	 the	 subjectively	distorted	 realm	 that	naïve
humans	live	in.	Husserl	argues	that	they	substitute	a	creation	of	their	minds	for	the	true	world.
As	an	unavoidable	fact,	science	is	accomplished	by	scientists,	and	scientists	are	people,	too:
the	conclusions	of	 scientists	need	 to	build	upon	 rather	 than	 reject	 this	world	 that	 appears	 to
humans	in	common,	and	scientists	must	return	to	this	realm	to	verify	and	give	meaning	to	their
conclusions.	Particular	 ideologies,	 I	 suggest,	have	a	parallel	 form	 to	naturalism:	 they	do	not
claim	merely	to	discover	true	features	of	the	world,	but	they	claim	to	discover	the	true	world
according	to	which	our	appearances	prior	 to	their	 theory	are	false,	and	to	explain	how	these
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appearances	themselves	are	generated	by	the	unapparent	world	they	purport	to	know.
Ideologism	 is	 unlike	 other	 ideologies	 in	 an	 important	 respect.	 It	 is	 motivated	 by	 the
multiplicity	 of	 such	 theories	 asserting	 a	 hidden	 real	 world,	 and	 in	 response	 it	 asserts	 a
subjectivistic	skepticism—according	to	their	theory,	we	are	all	caught	in	such	systems	of	false
appearances.	Thus	 ideologism	seems	to	suggest,	unlike	other	 ideologies,	 that	 there	 is	no	 true
world	 either	 hidden	 but	 scientifically	 knowable	 or	 available	 in	 common.	 There	 is	 just	 a
multiplicity	 of	 opinions.	 But	 by	 calling	 the	 variety	 of	 ideologies	 the	 ultimate	 reality,	which
ideology-studies	 can	 uncover,	 ideologism	 takes	 on	 the	 shape	 of	 other	 ideologies.	 Since
theorists	committed	to	ideologism	claim	that	by	adopting	an	ideology	a	person’s	other	opinions
are	 determined,	 they	 in	 their	 study	 of	 ideologies	 provide	 a	 dehumanizing	 explanation	 of
people’s	appearances,	beliefs,	and	reasonings—just	as	other	ideologies	claim	to	do.
The	 defenders	 of	 ideologism	 sometimes	 argue	 for	 this	 theory	 by	 observing	 that	 human
observations	are	never	of	raw	data.	We	never	experience	a	pristinely	objective	intuition	of	the
facts.	When	we	see	something	we	interpret	the	data	with	the	help	of	pre-established	opinions
and	concepts.	Thus,	as	I	have	been	told,	for	example,	what	one	see	as	a	tree,	another	may	see
as	a	nymph;	what	you	see	as	an	act	of	kindness,	I	may	see	as	a	passive-aggressive	attempt	to
keep	 me	 subjugated.	 The	 move	 that	 Kolnai	 represents	 as	 anti-Cartesian	 brilliance	 in
Experience	and	Judgment	might	be	taken	as	evidence	of	 this	claim.	Husserl	emphasizes	that
our	 basic	 experience	 of	 things	 in	 the	world,	 the	 experience	 upon	which	 the	 sciences	 build,
involves	never	pure	and	clear,	self-evident	data,	but	givens	that	we	accept	from	an	“external
horizon”	of	the	assumed	world,	a	horizon	by	which	we	anticipate	things	to	be	a	certain	way,
more	 or	 less	 of	 a	 certain	 type	 and	 style.	 And	 every	 particular	 thing	 also	 has,	 according	 to
Husserl’s	analysis	of	perception,	an	“internal	horizon,”	a	set	of	expectations	on	our	part	 that
the	 given	 object	 has	 certain	 features	we	do	 not	 yet	 directly	 encounter.	Given	 these	 rich	 and
unarticulated	 assumptions,	 every	 given	 is	 interpreted	 by	 us,	 and	 not	 just	 experienced	 self-
evidently.
Husserl’s	analysis	of	our	perceptions	allows	us	to	admit	that	subjective	history	and	belief
color	our	experiences.	Still,	we	should	not	conclude	with	a	subjectivistic	skepticism,	since	as
Husserl’s	 analysis	 also	 shows,	 the	world	 and	 its	 objects	 are	 still	given	 and	with	 their	 own
integrity.	Even	when	 some	person	 sees	 a	 tree	 as	 potential	 lumber	 and	 another	 sees	 it	 as	 the
body	of	a	tree	spirit,	there	is	still	a	basic	encounter	with	reality	they	share.	The	world	of	our
past	experience	is	the	source	of	these	anticipations,	and	often	enough	what	the	world	gives	us
fails	to	fulfill	our	expectations.	We	experience	such	failures,	too.	The	world	is	not	putty	in	the
hands	of	our	assumptions.
Husserl	argues	in	“The	Origin	of	Geometry”	that	geometry	comes	from	taking	the	shaped
things	of	our	concrete	surrounding	world	and	imaginatively	pushing	them	toward	ideal	“limit
shapes.”	 Geometry	 then	 progresses	 as	 a	 tradition,	 taught	 by	 one	 generation	 to	 the	 next	 and
added	 to.	The	“developed	capacity”	 to	 recognize	 the	ground	of	geometry	 in	our	 surrounding
world	is	not	passed	on	in	geometry	textbooks.	This	ground	may	even	be	forgotten,	although	it
can	 always	 be	 retraced.	 Authentic	 thinking	 about	 abstract	 objects	 requires	 the	 “actually
developed	 capacity	 for	 reactivating	 the	 primal	 beginnings”	 of	 our	 abstractions,	 recognizing
how	they	are	built	intellectually	out	of	materials	from	the	experienced	world.28	This	capacity
must	 be	 personally	 developed	 and	 cannot	 be	 handed	 over	 in	 a	 formula—but	 it	 can	 be
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apprenticed.
Ideologies	not	only	forget	but	deny	 their	origins.	They	cut	off	the	branch	they	are	sitting
on.	They	poison	the	spring	we	all	drink	from.	They	refuse	our	right	to	return	to	the	true	world
to	insightfully	cash	in	 their	propositions.	To	respond	to	 ideologies,	we	need	this	“developed
capacity”	for	concreteness.
Ideologism	alleges	 that	we	are	all	 ideologues.	 It	 is	 the	bad	faith	 tu	quoque	 response	of
those	who	want	a	free	pass	to	profess	their	worldview.	Ideologism	unmasks	naturalism	as	just
another	 ideology,	 and	 unmasks	 the	 facts	 as	 just	 as	 arbitrary	 as	 values	 and	 everything	 else
naturalism	tells	us	belongs	to	the	merely	subjective	false	show	that	is	the	human	world.	But	this
whole	style	of	thinking	is	a	mistake.
In	 fact,	 neither	worldviews	 nor	 human	 values	 float	 free.	 Even	 the	worst	 are	 ultimately
rooted	in	and	are	about	the	world	we	view	and	our	life	in	it.
People	too	often	turn	away	from	aspects	of	the	world	that	do	not	fit	their	system,	and—as
Weber	says—a	good	teacher	reminds	students	of	“inconvenient	facts”	that	do	not	flatter	 their
party	opinions.29	Husserl	shows	us	a	truth	that	is	inconvenient	for	ideologists:	human	persons
cannot	avoid	the	question	of	truth	and	the	norm	of	evidence,	even	when	it	comes	to	worldviews
and	values.
Teaching	 in	 the	 age	 of	 abstractions	 requires	 remembering	 our	 ground,	 that	 we	 find
ourselves	together,	minded,	and	in	the	world—and	then	apprenticing	and	nurturing	the	capacity
for	concreteness.
Husserl	as	Teacher
“It	 is	a	discomforting,	challenging,	and	troublesome	philosophy	that	has	no	use	 for	partisans	and	discipleship,
that	above	all	sends	everyone	off	on	the	path	of	one’s	own	reflective	thought.”30
In	 the	 classroom,	 Husserl	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 an	 uncharismatic	 teacher	 wrapped	 up	 in	 his
thoughts.	Many	students	who	would	become	significant	thinkers	in	their	own	rights	attended	his
classes,	but	 the	excitement	 that	drew	students	 to	 the	phenomenological	movement	came	from
the	content	of	his	thought	more	than	from	his	personality.	The	effect	it	had	on	Jean-Paul	Sartre,
though	 not	 a	 direct	 student	 of	 Husserl’s,	 illustrates	 what	 inspired	 many	 of	 his	 students.
Raymond	 Aron	 told	 Sartre,	 as	 they	 were	 Frenchly	 discussing	 philosophy	 over	 drinks,	 that
phenomenology	 allows	 one	 to	 philosophize	 about	 concrete	 human	 experience	 and	 about	 the
things	of	real	human	life—even	this	wine	bottle.	It	was	love	at	first	sight.
Modern	 philosophy,	 especially	 neo-Kantianism,	 still	 dominated.	 The	 modern
philosophical	 dogma	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 subject	 from	 the	 object,	 with	 the	 problem	 of
knowledge	that	results,	was	overcome	by	Husserl’s	recovery	of	intentionality,	his	rejection	of
psychologism,	 and	 his	 reaffirmation	 of	 the	 human	 connection	with	 the	world.	An	 energizing
concreteness	and	realism	invited	students	to	illuminate	descriptively	human	experience	of	our
world.	 The	 phenomenological	 groups	 that	 sprung	 up	 in	 German	 universities	 show	 how	 the
Logical	 Investigations	 opened	 the	 windows	 and	 rejuvenated	 creative	 minds.	 It	 is	 this
overcoming	of	modernity	that	prompted	Kolnai,	a	passing	student	who	would	not	call	himself	a
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phenomenologist,	to	say	that	Husserl	was	perhaps	the	greatest	philosopher	since	Aristotle	and
to	suggest,	“the	future	historiography	of	ideas…will	set	it	down	as	a	common	place	that	with
Husserl	commences	the	non-Cartesian	Age	in	European	thought.”31
Many	of	the	early	phenomenologists	rejected	Husserl’s	later	development,	especially	the
epoché	and	transcendental	idealism,	precisely	because	his	recovery	of	realism	had	convinced
them	so	deeply.	One	of	these	early	phenomenologists,	Edith	Stein	worked	with	Husserl	closely
as	 an	 assistant	 soon	 after	 this	 transcendental	 turn.	 In	 her	 words,	 “All	 of	 us	 had	 the	 same
question	on	our	minds....The	Logical	Investigations	had	caused	a	sensation	primarily	because
it	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 radical	 departure	 from	 critical	 idealism	which	 had	 a	Kantian	 and	 neo-
Kantian	stamp.…Knowledge	again	appeared	as	reception,	deriving	its	laws	from	objects	not,
as	 criticism	 has	 it,	 from	 determination	 which	 imposes	 laws	 on	 the	 objects.	 All	 the	 young
phenomenologists	 were	 confirmed	 realists.	 However,	 the	 Ideas	 included	 some	 expressions
which	sounded	as	though	the	Master	wished	to	return	to	idealism.”32
That	 many	 early	 students	 rejected	 his	 next	 big	 move	 shows,	 perhaps,	 that	 his	 lack	 of
charisma	had	pedagogic	value:	they	were	taught	not	cowed;	they	were	convinced	by	a	man’s
thoughts,	 not	 by	 a	 man.	 I	 think	 they	 misunderstood	 Husserl	 in	 rejecting	 transcendental
reflection,	but	the	point	is	that	these	“realist	phenomenologists”	saw	in	this	turn	a	relapse	into
pre-phenomenological	thinking,	into	the	ideology	of	modern	philosophy.	Husserl	rejected	also
a	 naïve	 objectivism,	 one	 that	 refused	 to	 take	 subjectivity	 seriously,	 and	 even	 if	 modern
philosophy	had	emphasized	subjectivity	at	the	expense	of	objectivity	and	thus	made	a	mess	of
both,	Husserl	was	convinced	that	objectivism	was	as	real	a	danger	as	subjectivism,	since	both
block	our	understanding	of	the	human	encounter	with	the	world.	We	must	not	make	the	world
into	a	misadventure	of	the	subject,	but	neither	may	we	make	the	person	just	another	element	of
the	world.
Though	Husserl	as	a	teacher	did	not	come	across	as	terribly	engaged	with	his	students,	it
was	according	to	himself	in	a	teaching	moment	that	he	became	truly	philosophical.	Lev	Shestov
had	written	 several	 articles	 critical	 of	Husserl,	 and	 in	 response	Husserl	 had	 sent	 a	 request
ahead	of	his	arrival	at	a	1928	conference	in	Amsterdam	that	Shestov	stay	a	few	days	longer	so
that	 they	might	meet	and	 talk.	He	 immediately	addressed	Shestov	personally	and	generously,
“with	sincerity,	enthusiasm,	and	inspiration.”33	First	he	defended	himself:	“You	have	turned	me
into	 a	 stone	 statue,	 raised	me	 onto	 a	 lofty	 pedestal,	 and	 then	with	 hammer-blows	 you	 have
shattered	this	statue	to	bits.	But	am	I	really	so	lapidary?”34	This	first	defense	is	interesting.	He
resisted	being	turned	into	an	inflexible	and	impersonal	set	of	theories.	If	we	approach	fellow
thinkers	like	that	we	may	attack	them	or	follow	them,	but	we	may	not	learn	from	them.	Husserl
encouraged	his	students	to	read	the	history	of	philosophy,	but	not	to	read	it	as	historically	done
and	gone.
It	 is	possible	 that	he	 failed	 to	always	approach	other	 thinkers	 the	way	he	wished	 to	be
approached.	 But	 this	 view	 of	 himself	 gives	 a	 clue	 about	 Husserl	 as	 a	 thinker	 and	 teacher.
While	 presenting	 himself	 as	 the	 founder	 a	 movement	 and	 a	 leader	 into	 a	 new	 epoch	 of
philosophy,	he	also	insisted	he	was—and	he	truly	was—always	a	beginner	and	a	re-beginner.
He	 felt	 an	 intense,	personal	 responsibility	 to	himself,	his	 students,	 and	 fellow	 thinkers	 to	be
honest	and	radical	in	his	defense	of	our	search	for	knowledge.
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Describing	himself	thirty	years	prior,	he	then	said	to	Shestov,	“To	my	own	indescribable
horror,	 I	 convinced	myself	 that	 if	 contemporary	philosophy	has	 said	 the	 last	word	 about	 the
nature	of	knowledge,	then	we	have	no	knowledge.”35	At	this	thought	we	should	wonder,	why
teach?	 If	 all	 we	 teachers	 do	 is	 reinforce	 the	 modern	 or	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 non-
knowledge,	of	locked	mind-cabinets	without	keyholes	or	worldviews	without	windows	on	the
world	 or	 ungroundable	 perception-permeating	 conceptual	 schemes,	 we	 are	 neither	 teaching
knowledge	nor	encouraging	and	drawing	out	our	students	so	they	may	discover	knowledge	on
their	 own.	 Husserl	 then	 confessed	 to	 Shestov	 a	 personal	 moment	 of	 radical	 philosophical
motivation:
Once,	 when	 I	 was	 giving	 a	 lecture	 at	 the	 university,	 expounding	 ideas	 I	 had	 taken	 over	 from	 our	 contemporaries,	 I
suddenly	felt	like	I	had	nothing	to	say,	that	I	was	standing	before	my	students	with	empty	hands	and	an	empty	soul.	And
then	 I	 resolved	 both	 for	myself	 and	 for	my	 students	 to	 submit	 the	 existing	 theories	 of	 knowledge	 to	 that	 severe	 and
unrelenting	criticism	which	has	aroused	the	indignation	of	so	many	people.
This	moment,	he	reported	to	Shestov,	was	the	“origin	of	my	Logical	Investigations.”36
His	sense	of	philosophical	responsibility,	for	himself	as	a	 thinker	and	as	a	teacher	with
influence	over	others,	gave	rise	to	what	Husserl	would	become	as	a	thinker	and	a	teacher.
Descriptions	of	him	while	teaching	formally	and	while	talking	with	students,	which	he	did
often,	indicate	paradoxically	that	Husserl	was	both	unengaged	with	his	audience	and	intensely
engaging.	He	would	often	speak	almost	as	though	speaking	to	himself.	He	monologued;	he	did
not	 lead	 discussions	 or	 elicit	 participation.	 Even	 worse,	 his	 intense	 involvement	 with	 the
objects	of	his	thought	seemed	sometimes	to	distract	him	from	the	presence	of	other	people.	But,
if	 we	 may	 flaunt	 current	 pedagogical	 nostrums,	 in	 doing	 so	 he	 still	 managed	 to	 teach,	 and
perhaps	teach	better	for	it.	We	can	guess	that	two	things	came	across,	often	enough	engagingly
and	even	inspirationally:	first,	on	the	object	side,	that	the	topics	of	his	thought	are	interesting,
and	second,	on	the	subject	side,	that	we	should	be,	like	him,	intensely	honest	philosophically,
searching	for	the	truths	of	being	and	facing	our	responsibilities	as	thinkers.	The	result	seems	to
have	been	many	students	who	wanted	to	get	to	the	truth	of	things	and	who	felt	not	only	free	but
obliged	to	disagree	with	“the	Master.”
In	1966,	Aron	Gurwitsch	eloquently	described	the	effect	Husserl	had	on	him	as	a	student:
When	the	author	made	his	first	acquaintance	with	Husserl’s	philosophy	about	forty	years	ago,	he	was	overwhelmed	by
the	 spirit	 of	 uncompromising	 integrity	 and	 radical	 philosophical	 responsibility,	 by	 the	 total	 devotedness	which	made	 the
man	 disappear	 behind	 his	 work.	 Soon	 the	 young	 beginner	 came	 to	 realize	 the	 fruitfulness	 both	 of	 what	 Husserl	 had
actually	accomplished	and	of	what	he	had	initiated,	 the	promise	of	further	fruitful	work.…It	was	the	style	of	Husserl’s
philosophizing,	 painstaking	 analytical	 work	 on	 concrete	 problems	 and	 phenomena	 rather	 than	 the	 opening	 up	 of	 large
vistas,	 that	made	 the	young	 student	 take	 the	decision	 to	devote	his	 life	 and	work	 to	 the	continuation	and	expansion	of
Husserl’s	phenomenology—in	a	word,	to	remain	a	disciple	forever,	faithful	to	Husserl’s	spirit	and	general	orientation,	but
at	the	same	time	prepared	to	depart	from	particular	theories	if	compelled	to	do	so	by	the	nature	of	the	problems	and	the
logic	of	the	theoretical	situation.37
Being	 a	 disciple	 of	 Husserl	 could	 not	 mean	 being	 a	 mere	 follower.	 By	 disappearing
behind	the	thought,	by	displaying	sincerity	and	dedication	to	the	truth,	Husserl	at	his	best	drew
out	of	his	students	a	desire	to	be	like	him	in	crucial	virtues	without	impressing	on	his	students
the	desire	to	become	another	him	or	to	act	as	his	dummy.
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From	the	point	of	view	of	someone	interested	in	research	on	Husserl,	it	is	frustrating	that
this	 thinker	 was	 so	 detail	 oriented,	 always	 working	 from	 the	 ground	 up,	 and	 repeatedly
rethinking	 everything,	 even	 and	 especially	 the	 beginnings.	 But	 of	 course	 these	 are	 some	 of
Husserl’s	 philosophical	 virtues.	 They	 manifest	 his	 sense	 of	 the	 responsibility	 that	 fallible
human	thinking	has	to	the	truth	of	being.	Toward	the	end	of	his	life,	he	commented	to	a	former
student,	Adelgrundis	Jaegerschmid,	that	philosophy	must	rededicate	itself	to	the	essential	thing,
“to	 truth.”	 “The	question	 about	 ultimate	 being,	 concerning	 truth,	must	 be	 the	object	 of	 every
philosophy.	 That	 is	 my	 life’s	 work.”38	 But	 this	 dedication	 to	 philosophy	 as	 a	 science,	 as
knowledge	of	being	and	of	the	subjectivity	that	knows	it,	means	also	humility:	“One	must	have
the	courage	to	admit	and	say	that	something	that	one	still	considered	true	yesterday,	but	that	one
sees	to	be	an	error	today,	is	such	an	error.	There	is	nothing	absolute	here.”39	The	absolute	truth
that	 philosophy	 must	 seek	 to	 be	 itself—and	 especially	 the	 most	 important	 truth,	 about	 the
absolute—is	 an	 infinite	 task,	 but	 this	 means	 philosophy	 is	 always	 on	 the	 way,	 always
incomplete	and	beginning	again.
I	think	Husserl	is	right	in	this	characterization	of	philosophy,	but	it	requires	a	lot	of	us.
Sometimes	a	student	is	looking	for	the	absolute	truth,	especially	about	the	most	pressing
practical	questions	of	personal	and	communal	 life.	When	such	a	student	meets	a	genius,	 it	 is
easy	 to	hold	on	 too	 tightly,	 to	be	convinced	 too	quickly	 that	one	has	happened	upon	and	can
now	 possess	 the	 ultimate	 key	 that	 unlocks	 the	 meaning	 of	 it	 all.	 The	 impulse	 to	 genuine
philosophy	might	 then	 collapse	 into	 enrapture	 by	 a	 grand	worldview	 or	 neat,	 all-explaining
ideological	system,	and	many	who	lack	Husserl’s	indefatigable	philosophical	conscience	and
daunting	work	ethic	were,	and	are,	more	satisfied	with	 that.	Though	Husserl	 said,	as	quoted
above,	that	his	life’s	work	was	reorienting	philosophy	to	its	true	telos	of	the	truth	of	being,	this
is	 why	 Husserl	 also	 characterizes	 his	 “task	 for	 the	 world,”	 as	 showing	 “people	 through
phenomenology	a	new	modality	of	 their	 responsibility	 in	order	 to	 free	 them	of	 their	vanities
and	their	ego.”40
Husserl	had	his	vanities,	too.	These	included	a	belief	that	he	had	a	mission	from	God	to
re-found	philosophy—this	time	in	its	fullness—and	a	desire	to	have	a	group	of	students	who
would	fulfill	his	work	for	him	faithfully.
He	influenced	many,	but	his	lack	of	continuers	troubled	him.	Especially	beginning	in	the
late	1920s,	others,	raising	existential	and	anthropological	issues	more	starkly,	stole	his	thunder.
More	than	a	few	students	rejected	central	parts	of	his	philosophy.	A	few	students	even	betrayed
him	personally.	(His	most	influential	student,	Martin	Heidegger,	in	letters	from	the	1920s	brags
of	 attacking	 his	 work	 while	 teaching	 and	 even	 of	 “wringing	 his	 neck,”	 writing	 in	 1923	 to
fellow	thinkers	in	the	phenomenological	milieu	about	the	“old	man”:	“He	lives	off	his	mission
as	 the	 ‘Founder	 of	 Phenomenology,’	 but	 nobody	 knows	what	 that	means.”41)	 Though	 he	 had
many	 more	 students	 who	 were	 grateful	 to	 him	 and	 remained	 friends	 with	 him,	 even	 those
students	 dedicated	 to	 him	 personally	 and	 philosophically	 were	 too	 independent	 minded	 to
fulfill	Husserl’s	mission	for	him.	Husserl	wrote	to	former	student	Roman	Ingarden	in	1927,	“it
often	weighs	heavily	on	my	soul	that	others	in	the	circle	of	phenomenologists	do	not	see	this
necessity”	 of	 the	 paths	 his	 thought	 had	 taken:	 “instead,	 they	 all	 prefer	 to	 follow	 their	 own
way.”42
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While	 sick	 in	 the	 fall	 of	 1937,	 in	 conversation	with	 Jaegerschmid,	 he	wished	 to	 have
succeeded	 in	 freeing	himself	 from	vanity,	“including	 the	professional	vanity	without	which	a
young	person	 cannot	work:	 the	 honor	 and	 admiration	 of	my	 students.”43	 Part	 of	 this	 fault	 of
Husserl’s	reminds	us	of	the	natural	allure	of	admiration.	But	for	Husserl	it	was	more	complex.
Ingarden	described	the	situation	beautifully:
The	range	of	problems	with	which	he	occupied	himself,	problems	which	in	their	essence	are	entirely	original	and	new,	is
enormous.	 Their	 solution,	 however,	 if	 they	 were	 all	 to	 be	 treated	 with	 the	 same	 exactness	 and	 intuitive	 vision,	 was
undoubtedly	beyond	 the	spiritual	powers	of	one	man.	But	Husserl	could	not	 treat	 them	in	any	other	way,	guided	as	he
was	by	his	great	sense	of	responsibility,	and	his	ethical	approach	to	his	whole	philosophical	activity.	The	task	to	which	he
devoted	his	life,	and	with	the	development	of	his	personality	was	bound	up,	was—frankly	speaking—impossible.	No	one
could	 really	help	him	with	 it.	He	often	 spoke	of	 a	generation	of	 “selfless”	 researchers,	who	would	devote	 themselves
completely	 to	 the	 solution	 of	 the	 problems	 he	 had	 outlined.	 But	 of	 course	 that	 was	 just	 an	 illusion.	 Should	 such
researchers	be	really	“selfless,”	they	would	be	only	simulacra	of	men,	and	not	human	beings	of	flesh	and	blood.	As	such
they	could	never	solve	any	of	his	problems.	And	should	they	be	really	human,	it	would	be	simply	impossible	for	them	in
the	Husserlian	spirit.44
In	1935,	toward	the	end	of	his	life	and	while	being	increasingly	marginalized	socially	and
intellectually	 within	 Germany,	 and	 even	 prevented	 from	 travelling	 abroad	 to	 conferences
because,	 as	 ethnically	 Jewish,	 he	was	 seen	 by	 the	 regime	 as	 not	 a	 proper	 representative	 of
Germany,	Husserl	lamented	to	Jaeger-schmid:	“except	for	[Eugen]	Fink,	for	the	past	four	years
I	have	not	had	one	 student	 to	whom	I	could	 speak	my	mind.…Now	 that	 I	 am	seventy—I	am
seventy-six—I	have	 no	 circle	 of	 students	 or	 the	 possibility	 to	 lecture,	 I	 lack	 the	 school	 that
would	want	 to	 take	my	thought	 further	and	publish	 them.”45	Still,	 later	 in	conversations	with
her,	 he	 seems	 to	 remember	 that	 he	 is	 not	 the	 only	 person	 with	 the	 philosophical	 vocation
requiring	taking	one’s	own	path,	saying	to	Jaeger-schmid,	his	student	and	confidant:	“Promise
me	never	to	say	anything	just	because	others	have	said	it.”46
Part	vanity	and	part	self-consolation	 in	 the	face	of	his	 inability	 to	 fulfill	 the	 impossible
responsibility	of	a	philosopher,	this	conceit—and	its	disappointment—stayed	with	Husserl,	it
seems,	till	the	end,	or	at	least	close	to	it.	Jaegerschmid	reports,	that	“from	Maundy	Thursday
on”—less	 than	 a	 fortnight	before	his	death	on	April	 26,	1938—“he	did	not	 speak	one	more
word	about	his	philosophical	work,	which	had	occupied	him	throughout	the	previous	months.
Just	how	much	his	entire	life	was	subject	to	the	mission	of	a	higher	power	was	revealed	only
as	he	was	dying.	Now	he	felt	finally	discharged	and	released	from	his	task.”47
Conclusions
“In	the	path	of	true	science,	this	path	is	endless.	Accordingly,	phenomenology	demands	that	the	phenomenologist
foreswear	 the	 ideal	of	a	philosophical	 system	and	yet	as	a	humble	worker	 in	community	with	others,	 live	 for	a
perennial	philosophy.”48
While	restoring	the	validity	of	 the	experienced	world,	Husserl	rehabilitates	human	reason	as
capable	of	and	fulfilled	in	truth.	His	attacks	on	truth-obscuring	dogmas	can	be	understood	as
reminding	reason	of	its	work	when	it	has	been	distracted	and	dejected	by	ideologies.	For	many
thinkers,	his	call	back	to	the	things	themselves	was	rejuvenating	fresh	air,	opening	the	windows
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
2.
 L
ex
in
gt
on
 B
oo
ks
. A
ll r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
of	the	modern	mind.
His	claim	to	make	philosophy	a	science	must	not	be	misunderstood.	This	science,	like	all
others,	is	accomplished	by	human	beings,	is	never	perfect,	and	must	be	done	with	the	help	of
others,	both	contemporary	coworkers	and	those	long	dead.	About	himself,	Husserl	wrote,	“If
he	has	been	obliged,	on	practical	grounds,	 to	 lower	 the	 ideal	of	 the	philosopher	 to	 that	of	a
downright	beginner,	he	has	at	 least	 in	his	old	age	 reached	for	himself	 the	complete	certainty
that	he	should	thus	call	himself	a	beginner.”49
Also	struggling	 to	become	genuine	beginners,	 those	he	 influenced	went	 in	all	directions
doing	their	own	thing.	At	the	end,	he	says,	“I	seek	not	to	instruct,	but	to	lead,	to	point	out	and
describe	what	 I	 see.	 I	claim	no	other	 right	 than	 that	of	 speaking	according	 to	my	best	 lights,
principally	before	myself	but	in	the	same	manner	also	before	others,	as	one	who	has	lives	in
all	 its	 seriousness	 the	 fate	 of	 a	 philosophical	 existence.”50	Yet	 he	was	 disappointed	 that	 he
lacked	 phenomenological	 heirs,	 faithful	 students	who	might	 carry	 out	 the	 “infinite	 tasks”	 of
philosophy	as	he	wanted.	His	lack	of	followers	must	not	be	taken	as	a	failure.	With	Husserl’s
help,	we	 can	 insightfully	understand	 and	 reject	 ideologies.	We	 then	 can	 appreciate	 the	great
and	 varied	work	 lying	 before	 our	 fallible	 reason	 and	 be	 thankful	 that	 good	 teachers	 are	 not
gurus.	 The	 quality	 of	 a	 teacher	 cannot	 be	 judged	 by	 his	 students’	 mistakes	 when	 they	 have
failed	to	follow	him	faithfully,	but	it	can	be	judged	if	his	students	have	merely	followed	him
faithfully.
Though	unpolitical,	Husserl’s	life’s	work	can	be	seen	as	profoundly	anti-ideological.	One
of	his	 students,	 Jan	Patočka,	had	another	 student,	Czech	dissident	Václav	Havel,	who	wrote
bravely	of	 ideology:	“To	wandering	humankind	 it	offers	an	 immediately	available	home:	all
one	has	to	do	is	accept	it,	and	suddenly	everything	becomes	clear	once	more,	life	takes	on	new
meaning,	and	all	mysteries,	unanswered	questions,	anxiety,	and	 loneliness	vanish.	Of	course,
one	 pays	 dearly	 for	 this	 low-rent	 home:	 the	 price	 is	 abdication	 of	 one’s	 own	 reason,
conscience,	 and	 responsibility.”	 It	 is	 most	 of	 all	 in	 defense	 of	 reason,	 conscience,	 and
responsibility	 that	Husserl’s	philosophy	 is	animated,	and	we	see	Husserl’s	 reverberations	 in
Havel’s	 claim	 that	 “the	 human	 predisposition	 to	 truth”	 is	 ultimately	what	 is	 at	 issue	 in	 our
response	to	ideology.51
We	might	 conclude	by	pointing	 to	Patočka’s	dissident	 death	 in	Prague	 and	 to	Wojtyła’s
courageous	 crusade	 to	 build	 a	 church	 in	Kraków	 as	 evidence	 that	 Husserl’s	 influence	 bore
heroic	fruit	in	the	struggles	against	ideology	and	totalitarianism,	which	must	also	be	struggles
for	the	integrity	of	the	person	as	reasonable,	responsible,	and	called	to	live	in	truth.	But	giving
him	this	credit	would	be	a	stretch,	and	self-defeating.	Honesty	would	then	force	us	to	debit	him
for	 the	 many	 ideological	 failings	 of	 those	 he	 influenced.	 Instead,	 each	 thinker	 must	 take
responsibility	for	himself,	and	it	is	a	mark	of	Husserl’s	success	as	a	teacher	and	leader	that	his
students	and	admirers	went	in	their	many	own	directions.
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